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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
TROY LABRUM, : Case No. 930235-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
Emphasis added. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution, section 1 provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
Emphasis added. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property , without due process of law. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec• 12• [Rights of accused persons•] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
testify against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990) provides: 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission 
of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990) provides in pertinent 
part: 
76-3-203. Felony conviction -- Indeterminate term of 
imprisonment -- Increase of sentence if firearm 
used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
follows: 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second 
degree, for a term at not less than one year nor 
more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a 
firearm was used in the commission or furtherance 
of the felony, the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted for a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed 
five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; 
Emphasis added. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1993) provides in 
pertinent part: 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons 
-- Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in 
Subsection (3) in concert with two or more persons 
is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense 
as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as 
used in this section means the defendant and two or 
more other persons would be criminally liable for 
the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed 
under this section are: 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to an 
enhanced minimum term of six years in prison. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate 
offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the 
primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced 
penalties under this section that the persons with 
whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or 
convicted, or that any of those persons are charged 
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury 
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty 
under this section. The imposition of the penalty 
is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing 
judge that this section is applicable. In 
conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the 
applicability of this section. 
Emphasis added. 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the incomplete record requires that Mr. 
Labrum be granted a new trial? 
Standard of review -- correctness. This is a question of 
law reviewable for correctness. Where portions of the record are 
missing and cannot be reconstructed by agreement of the parties, a 
new trial is required. State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 
1983) . 
2. Whether the prosecutor's direct comments on witness 
credibility constitute misconduct requiring reversal? 
Standard of Review -- plain error. 
When objections are not made at trial and properly 
preserved, appellate review is under a "plain error" 
standard. Plain errors are those that "should have been 
obvious to the trial court and that affect the 
substantial rights of the accused." 
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P. 2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting 
State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Utah App. 1991). 
3. Whether the jury's failure to make a finding that a 
firearm was used in this offense requires that the firearm 
enhancement be set aside? 
Standard of review -- correctness. This involves, a 
question of statutory construction. The trial court's construction 
of a statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness. In re 
Estate of Anderson, 821 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App. 1991). 
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4. Whether the "gang enhancement"1 is constitutional,2 
and was properly applied in this case? 
Standard of review — correctness. This involves a 
question of statutory construction. The trial court's construction 
of a statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness. In re 
Estate of Anderson, 821 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Troy Labrum (d.o.b. 7/6/74) and co-defendant David Mills 
(8/30/72) were charged in an amended information (R. 7-9) with 
attempted homicide, a 2nd degree felony, stemming from a drive-by 
shooting at 2100 South and 700 East on September 20, 1992. The 
information also indicated that the State would be seeking a 
firearm enhancement (Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990)) and "gang" 
enhancement (Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1993)). Id. A 
third defendant, Joshua Behunin (d.o.b. 3/25/75) was handled 
through the juvenile system. 
HJtah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1993), commonly referred 
to as the gang enhancement. 
2Mr. Labrum did not challenge the constitutionality of the 
gang enhancement below. However, the trial court's failure to make 
written findings as required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5) (c) 
necessitates that the increased sentence pursuant to the gang 
enhancement be vacated. Anticipating that this Court will remand 
to allow the trial court to make the necessary findings, appellant 
represents that a constitutional challenge will be made at that 
time. In the interests of judicial economy, this court should give 
the trial court guidance as to the constitutionality and proper 
application of the gang enhancement, as it will be appealed if 
reimposed. 
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Jury trial was held February 16-18 before Senior Judge 
Jay E. Banks. See transcripts, R. 97-279 (Feb. 16), 280-485 (Feb. 
17), and 486-627 (Feb. 18). Mr. Labrum and his co-defendant were 
convicted. R. 49 (verdict for Mr. Labrum), 615-6. 
Mr. Labrum was sentenced on March 22, 1993 to a term of 
1 to 15 years, to run consecutively with the 6 year gang 
enhancement and 5 year firearm enhancement, and to pay 
restitution.3 R. 8 0 (attached as Addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The transcript of the trial is not complete. The court 
reporter did not record the instructions given to the jury. See R. 
504-6. The reporter begins by noting: 
(Whereupon, the Judge commenced the reading of the 
Instructions at 10:05 a.m. -- not reported on the 
record.) 
The reporter notes a sidebar concerning instruction 20, and 
transcribes half a page. The transcript continues: 
(The Court continues to read the Instructions 
starting with No. 21. The time now is 10:45 a.m.) 
3The trial court's application of the enhancements appears 
incorrect. The firearm enhancement provides for a consecutive 1 
year sentence, and an optional consecutive sentence of 0 to 5. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (1990). The Judgment, Sentence 
(Commitment) appears to show a determinate 5 year sentence for the 
firearm enhancement. The gang enhancement provides for an enhanced 
minimum term of 6 years. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(3) (d) . Mr. 
Labrum7s sentence (if both enhancements were appropriate) should 
therefore have been 6 to 15 years (2nd degree felony plus gang 
enhancement), consecutive with a 1 year term (firearm enhancement), 
consecutive with a 0 to 5 years term (discretionary firearm 
enhancement). Appellant contends here that neither enhancement was 
properly imposed and both must be vacated. 
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(Throughout the reading of the Instructions, 
the Judge injected comments which were not part of the 
written Instructions. These comments were inserted in an 
ad lib manner, and I was not aware that his words were 
anything other than what was on the printed page until 
after hearing complete sentences. Therefore, these 
comments were not reported.) 
(Time is 10:55 a.m. ) 
R. 505-6. For a period of 50 minutes, therefore, the reporter 
transcribed only half a page. 
In closing arguments, the prosecutor twice vouched for 
the truthfulness of state witnesses. Mr. Jones made the following 
statements: 
But I thought Mr. Owens was at least candid and honest 
and he said, I didn't recognize him because he changed 
his appearance and it threw me off. 
R. 512. 
It's just an incredible coincidence that a 
police officer sees these three people together? 
I thought he was very candid and honest. He 
didn't try to overstep it. 
R. 521. 
When the jury returned its verdicts, it made no finding 
whatsoever that a firearm was used in the commission of the 
offense. See R. 49, 615-7 (jurors return their verdict, are 
polled, and excused without making any finding that a firearm was 
used). 
The court record contains no written findings concerning 
the applicability of the gang enhancement as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5)(c) (Supp. 1993). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The transcript of the trial contains a prejudicial 
omission for a period of fifty minutes while the trial court read 
the jury instructions. The transcript indicates the trial court 
"ad libbed" throughout the reading of the instructions. The trial 
court made prejudicial statements during prior "ad libbing' in the 
voir dire phase of the trial. Absent a complete record, Mr. 
Labrum's appeal right is violated. Mr. Labrum should be granted a 
new trial. 
In closing arguments, the prosecutor vouched for the 
truthfulness of two of his witnesses. These prejudicial statements 
were plain error. The evidence in this case was highly 
conflicting, and it is likely that the jury was swayed by the 
prosecutor's improper remarks. 
The jury made no finding that a firearm was used in the 
commission of the offense charged. § 76-3-203 requires that the 
trier of fact make a finding that a firearm was used before the 
enhanced sentence may be imposed. Absent such a finding, the 
firearm enhancement must be vacated. 
The trial court failed to enter written findings 
concerning the applicability of the gang enhancement as required by 
§ 76-3-203.1(5) (c) . The enhanced sentence must be vacated. The 
gang enhancement statute is unconstitutionally vague, both as to 
its terms and as to standards for enforcement,. As a matter of due 
process, the statute should require a jury determination by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence in this case was 
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insufficient to support application of the gang enhancement. The 
enhanced sentence should be vacated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE INCOMPLETE RECORD IN THIS CASE 
PRECLUDES COMPLETE REVIEW ON APPEAL, AND 
REQUIRES THAT MR. LABRUM BE GRANTED A NEW 
TRIAL. 
The transcript in this case conclusively reveals that the 
record is incomplete. The court reporter failed to record the 
reading of the instructions. Throughout the instructions, the 
trial court "injected comments which were not part of the written 
Instructions . . . in an ad lib manner." R. 505. There is no 
legal reason, or excuse for this failure to transcribe this portion 
of the trial proceedings. 
In State v. Taylor, 664 p.2d 439 (Utah 1983) the Supreme 
Court reversed a jury conviction due to inadequacies in the 
transcript of jury voir dire: 
When faced with claims that a juror's responses to voir 
dire questions demonstrated actual bias, this Court is 
not at liberty on appeal to assume what those answers 
showed when they are totally absent from the record and 
cannot be reconstructed by agreement of the parties. 
Therefore, it was error for the district court to fail to 
order a new trial in the face of this inadequate record. 
Id. at 447 (footnote omitted). 
In this case, the transcript itself indicates that the 
trial court "ad libbed" throughout the reading of the jury 
instructions. Similar "ad libbing" can be seen in the voir dire 
phase of the trial, and prejudicial statements were made by the 
trial court: 
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The legislature fixes the sentence. And it's 
the duty of the Court to impose sentencing. And before 
I would impose sentencing, I would want to know something 
about the background of each of these defendants, 
together with other information. 
But the penalty fixed by the legislature is 
what we call an Indeterminate Sentence. That means they 
impose a minimum and maximum sentence. And in this case 
they have imposed a penalty of 1 to 15 years in the Utah 
State Penitentiary and/or a fine not exceeding $10,000. 
Now, as I indicated to you, it's the duty for 
the Court to impose sentence. I may place a person on 
probation on condition --on any condition that I feel is 
justified. And I have the discretion of doing that --
imposing some jail time, imposing any condition such as 
maybe education, participation in programs, anything like 
that that I see fit to do. 
But if I commit either one or both of them to 
the state penitentiary, then my jurisdiction ceases and 
the jurisdiction passes to the Board of Pardons. 
R. 112 (emphasis added). 
The import of these statements is that the trial court 
fully expects a conviction. Sentence will be imposed. The trial 
court is not speaking in the abstract; rather, it is referring 
specifically to the two defendants before it in this case, and the 
fact that it will be imposing sentence. These statements fly in 
the face of the defendants' due process right to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See State 
v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1988); Sandstrom v. Montana, 
442 U.S. 510, 520, 99 S. Ct. 2450, , 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 48 (1979); In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-3, 25 L.Ed.2d 
368, 375 (1970). 
With the record as it stands, it is impossible to tell 
what additional prejudicial statements the trial court might have 
made while "ad libbing" to the jury during the reading of the jury 
instructions. Unlike State v. Menzies, 845 P. 2d 220, 240 (Utah 
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1992) , the omission here does not involve only argument outside the 
presence of the jury. This omission may not be cured by 
"review[ing] any claim that could have conceivably raised at this 
point as though it had been properly preserved." Id. (footnote 
omitted). 
The lack of a proper transcript precludes and impinges on 
Mr. Labrum's constitutional right to a full appeal as guaranteed by 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, and requires that 
this case be reversed for a new trial at which a complete record 
can be made, 
POINT II. THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY VOUCHED 
FOR THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THE STATE'S 
WITNESSES. 
On two occasions, the prosecutor vouched for the 
truthfulness of testimony given by the State's witnesses. "But I 
thought Mr. Owens was at least~candid and honest . . . ." R. 512. 
"I thought he was very candid and honest." R. 521. 
Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, bars admission of an 
expert's testimony as to the truthfulness of a witness on a 
particular occasion. State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) . 
Opinion testimony concerning credibility must be limited to 
testimony addressing a witness' general reputation for 
truthfulness, leaving the credibility determination for the fact-
finder. State v. Hovt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah App. 1991). A 
prosecutor may not ask a defendant to comment on the veracity of 
other witnesses. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1992); 
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State v. Palmer, No. 930192-CA, slip op. at 5-6 (Utah App. July 22, 
1993) . 
The prosecutor is in no better position than an expert, 
the defendant, or any other witness to address the credibility of 
the State's witnesses at trial. The prosecutor's statements 
constitute misconduct, and Mr. Labrum should be granted a new 
trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two prong test 
for reversals for improper statements of counsel. State v. Valdez, 
513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973) ; see also State v. Trov. 688 P.2d 483, 486 
(Utah 1984); State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 (Utah 1983), overruled 
on other grounds in State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 
1985); State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982); State v. 
Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976). 
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so 
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case 
is, did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in considering 
in determining their verdict, and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced 
by those remarks. 
Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426. See also State v. Palmer, No. 930192-CA, 
slip op. at 3 (Utah App. July 22, 1993). 
The prosecutor here drew the jurors attention to matters 
which they would not be justified in considering in determining 
their verdict. The prosecutor's personal opinion about the 
veracity of the State's witnesses is not probative, does not 
constitute evidence in the case, and is improper. The prosecutor 
has considerable latitude in commenting on the evidence, see 
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Valdez, 513 P. 2d at 427, but is not at liberty to express his 
personal views concerning the veracity of his own witnesses. 
The evidence in this case was highly conflicting. 
Defense alibi witnesses were contradicted by the State's paid 
informant. Compare testimony of paid informant Kevin McCray (R. 
284-220) with that of Stan Spears (R. 421-433), Connie Labrum (R. 
433-442), Lynette Ward (R. 467-483), and Joseph Kelly (R. 443-467) 
(alibi for automobile allegedly used). The incident occurred 
rapidly and the victims had only a brief opportunity to view the 
perpetrators on any of the approximately three occasions they saw 
the other vehicle in traffic. E.g., R. 183 ("shooting happened 
pretty fast"); 198-9 ("couple of seconds"); 241 ("A couple seconds. 
Five at the most."). Two victims identified Mr. Labrum but could 
not identify Mr. Mills; the other two victims identified Mr. Mills 
but could not identify Mr. Labrum. See, e.g. , R. 584 (prosecutor's 
closing). Given the conflicting and contentious nature of the 
evidence, it is more likely that the jury was swayed by the 
prosecutor's improper statements: 
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their 
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of 
differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood 
that they will be improperly influenced through the 
remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors 
may be searching for guidance in weighing and 
interpreting the evidence. They may be especially 
susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence 
may be sufficient to affect the verdict. Counsel is 
obligated in such cases to avoid, as far as possible, any 
reference to those matters the jury is not justified in 
considering. 
Trov, 688 P.2d at 486-87. 
Mr. Labrum should be granted a new trial. 
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POINT III. THE FIREARM ENHANCEMENT WAS 
IMPROPERLY APPLIED BECAUSE THE JURY MADE 
NO FINDING THAT A FIREARM WAS USED IN THE 
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE. 
The prosecution neither sought nor received a special 
verdict concerning whether a firearm, facsimile, or representation 
of a firearm was used in the commission of the offense. The jury's 
verdict does not address the issue. Absent a finding by the trier 
of fact, the trial court is not at liberty to impose the firearm 
enhancement. 
There can be no question that the jury is the trier of 
fact in a jury trial. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P. 2d 598, 601 (Utah 
1983) ("exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility 
of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make findings of fact") . 
See also jury instruction 5 (R. 54) ("The function of the jury is 
to try the issues of fact . . . . " ) ; instruction 9 (R. 58) 
("exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight of the evidence"); Instruction No. 10 (R. 59) ("final judges 
and must determine from the evidence what the facts are"). 
The firearm enhancement statute requires that "if the 
trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the representation 
of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted 
for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively 
and not concurrently . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990). 
Statutes are interpreted according to the plain meaning of their 
15 
words. State v. Cox, 826 P. 2d 656, 662 (Utah App. 1992) . The 
requirements of the plain language of the statute have not been 
satisfied. The trial court should not have imposed the firearm 
enhancement, and that sentencing enhancement should be vacated. 
POINT IV. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND EVEN IF 
CONSTITUTIONAL WAS MISAPPLIED IN THIS 
CASE. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENTER 
WRITTEN FINDINGS AS REQUIRED BY THE 
STATUTE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (5) (c) provides: 
The imposition of the penalty is contingent upon a 
finding by the sentencing judge that this section is 
applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court 
shall enter written findings of fact concerning the 
applicability of this section. 
The record does not contain separate written findings as required. 
Absent such findings, the enhancement must be vacated. Mr. 
Labrum's sentence should be corrected accordingly. 
B. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
1. Defendants are Entitled to a 
Jury Finding of Liability Under 
the Statute by Proof Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt Before the 
Sentence Enhancement Is 
Imposed. 
(This issue is currently pending before the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Fred A. Alvarez, No. 910019, and is due to be 
argued the first week of September.) 
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Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees 
defendants the right to a jury trial. A jury, rather than the 
trial court, should make the factual findings concerning the 
applicability of the sentencing enhancement. 
The gang enhancement statute states that M[t]his section 
does not create any separate offense but provides an enhanced 
penalty for the primary offense." The legislature is elevating 
form over substance. Oregon has stated that "facts which 
constitute the crime are for the jury and those which characterize 
the defendant are for the sentencing judge." State v. Wedge, 652 
P. 2d 773, 777 (Or. 1982) . This distinction should be recognized in 
Utah. 
Wedcre involved a sentencing enhancement for use of a 
firearm in the commission of an offense. The Oregon Supreme Court 
found: 
Although the challenged statute is denominated 
an enhanced penalty statute, in effect it creates a new 
crime. The jury only considered evidence offered on the 
question of first degree robbery, and convicted him of 
that offense, but the defendant was sentenced on the 
basis of having been found guilty of the crime of "first 
degree robbery using a firearm." If the legislature had 
actually described the crime as "first degree robbery 
using a firearm" the use of the firearm would certainly 
be an element and there would be no doubt defendant would 
have a right to a jury determination of guilt. The 
legislature cannot eliminate constitutional protections 
by separating and relabeling elements of a crime. 
Id. at 778. 
The gang enhancement does not state what standard of 
proof is to be applied by the trial court in making its findings of 
fact. The statute provides that l!,[i]n concert with two or more 
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persons7 as used in this section means the defendant and two or 
more other persons would be criminally liable for the offense as 
parties under Section 76-2-202." Other parties can only be 
criminally liable if convicted by proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
by a unanimous jury. By incorporating Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202, 
implicitly the conduct and intent of the other actors must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Even if not required as a matter of statutory 
construction, due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Under the state due process clause the facts supporting application 
of the enhancement should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 577-80, 585-88, 591 (Utah 1987) 
(Justices Stewart, Durham, and Zimmerman, in separate opinions, 
collectively hold that aggravating circumstances in felony cases 
are elements of the crime which the jury must unanimously find 
beyond a reasonable doubt). Absent some express standard, there is 
a serious danger that trial courts will make findings based on a 
lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Although the federal due process clause does not provide 
the protections Mr. Labrum seeks here,4 under the state due process 
clause this Court should find that commission of a crime "in 
concert with two or more persons" is a new offense and factual 
determinations should be made by the jury by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Utah law provides for a jury determination for 
4McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 
L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). 
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both the firearm enhancement (Utah Code Ann, § 76-3-2*03) and under 
the habitual criminal statutes (Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 et seq. 
(1990) ) . The same protections should apply to the gang 
enhancement. Mr. Labrum's sentencing enhancement should be 
vacated, and the case remanded for a jury determination of the 
applicability of the enhancement. 
2. The Gang Enhancement is Void 
for Vagueness. 
The due process clauses of both the federal and state 
constitutions prohibit application of criminal statutes that are 
vague. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-9, 92 
S.Ct. 2294, , 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-8 (1972) the Supreme Court 
described this doctrine: 
It is a basic principle of due process that an 
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are 
not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important 
values. First, because we assume that man is free to 
steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that 
laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so 
that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the 
innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be 
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those 
who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates 
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the 
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application. Third, but related, where a vague statute 
"abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment 
freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of 
[those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead 
citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone7 . . 
. than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were 
clearly marked." 
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In Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-8, 103. S.Ct. 
1855, , 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983), the Court clarified: 
Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to 
citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized 
recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness 
doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other principal 
element of the doctrine -- the requirement that a 
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement." Where the legislature fails to provide 
such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a 
standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, 
and juries to pursue their personal predilections." 
Cites and footnote omitted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 does not carefully and 
clearly proscribe the conduct it seeks to punish. Subsection 
(1) (b) incorporates Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202, which provides 
criminal liability for anyone who "solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense . . . ." The person of 
average intelligence is unable to understand what this means, and 
conform his or her conduct to such a law. 
Of more concern is the complete failure to set forth 
explicit standards for enforcement of the statute. This statute 
"impermissibly delegates policy matters to policemen, judges, and 
juries for iresolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the 
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." 
Gravned, 408 U.S. at 108-9. 
Section (5)(b) of the statute allows the enhancement to 
be applied based on the actions of uncharged and unnamed 
individuals, thus denying defendants notice of the allegations 
against them and precluding them from meeting those allegations. 
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In State v. Roberts, 612 P.2d 360 (Utah 1980) and State v. Casarez, 
656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court found that 
fundamental fairness requires that a criminal defendant be allowed 
to inspect a presentence investigation report. Sentencing a 
defendant to an enhanced sentence based on uncharged and unnamed 
parties is no better than sentencing defendants based on the 
undisclosed allegations of a presentence investigation, and should 
similarly fall under the due process clause. See also State v. 
Johnson, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5-6 (Utah 1993) (report of treatment 
center, which contained double and triple hearsay, not sufficiently 
reliable to be used in sentencing) . As set forth in Point IV.B.l., 
supra at 17, the statute also fails to set forth the proper 
standard of proof to be applied. 
Finally, § 76-3-203.1 does not meet its purpose in a 
rational manner. Although the statute's purpose is not clear on 
its face, the legislative history of the gang enhancement indicates 
that the statute was to be enforced in select cases involving 
gangs. Representative Rushton, sponsor of the bill in the House, 
stated "the idea behind the enhanced penalties in California and 
the idea here was to get that center core, that's the core group of 
hardened criminals that supplies the money, supplies the impetus 
for a true criminal street gang." Transcript at 3 (copy attached 
as Addendum B) . The statute does not meet its purpose in a 
rational manner. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 should be declared 
unconstitutional. 
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3. The Evidence Here Fails to 
Support a Finding that the Gang 
Enhancement is Applicable. 
There was no evidence introduced at trial concerning the 
intent of the rear seat passenger in the car of the drive-by 
shooter. Kevin McCray testified that he was "no more than ten 
feet" away when Mr. Labrum and Mr. Mills allegedly discussed their 
intention to commit a drive-by shooting. Mr. Behunin, the alleged 
backseat passenger, was " [f]ifteen or 20 feet" away. R. 287. 
There is no evidence that Mr. Behunin heard the alleged 
conversation, much less participated in it. Absent proof of 
intent, Mr. Behunin is not criminally liable under § 76-2-202, and 
Mr. Labrum's sentence may not be enhanced based on Mr. Behunin7s 
presence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Labrum is entitled to a new trial due to omissions in 
the transcription of the trial during the reading of the jury 
instructions. Mr. Labrum is entitled to a new trial due to the 
prosecutor's misconduct in closing arguments. 
If this Court fails to find that Mr. Labrum is entitled 
to a new trial, then his sentence should be corrected. The jury 
made no finding that a firearm was used in the commission of this 
offense. Absent such a finding, the firearm enhancement must be 
vacated. The trial court made no written findings concerning 
application of the gang enhancement, so it must be vacated. The 
gang enhancement is unconstitutional, and should not be applied. 
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The gang enhancement should not be applicable without a jury 
finding of applicability. Finally, the evidence in this case fails 
to support a finding that the gang enhancement is applicable. Mr. 
Labrum's sentence should be corrected accordingly. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of September, 1993. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
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Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 1st day of 
September, 1993. 
Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of September, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UT 
* 2 2 1593 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
VS. 
Ircu Loibr 
Plaintiff. 
IUV) 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
case NO. ^ w n n q i 
Count No. i 
Honorable T«y t : - & a n l c 
Clerk r ^ t f r r y u ^ . ttwif 
Defendant 
Reporter €v i z ^ h ^ , \Nalrairy: 
Bailiff K r i r h 1 Vlr, 
D The motion of . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted O denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted b y ^ a jury; a the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea of np contest; of the offense of ^ t ^ ^ ^ p r ^ ^ r a ^ n l j W i | / w Mti/fffa^
 t a felony 
of the 1**« . misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and degree, D a class. 
represented by n . irh/i&o/* and the State being represented by g.^Wftrvrgof. is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of 
G not to exceed five years; 
p( of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
O of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
O not to exceed years; 
Q and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $. 
years and which may be for life; 
Td and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $gQTl-frfl tn V ich*i ftrp/Sayo ^ frt <\snt* \Ne9tdr j Dflnet tw* 
- * 
\m<zm 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
& such sentence is to run consecutively with (qanj flrrt R lYf f l rh i -f,v\\^lY\Urvcv\V StTifcryvrgt 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
O Defendant is granted a stay of the above (a prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent. Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
) d Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County Otfor delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitmej 
^ Commitment shall issue "forthrtlfo 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
*r 
Defense Counsel 
*'
1
-*-Deputy County Attorney 
-SO 
Page 
_Lof_i 
i w h i i * . rAuf t i (Gr««n—Judml (Yallow— Jail/Pnson/AP&Pt (Pmk—Oatensal (Goktenrod—State} nnOCCO 
ADDENDUM B 
Legislative History of.§ 76-3-203.1 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN SENATE BILL 52, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
76-3-203.1, THE PENALTY ENHANCEMENT FOR OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THREE 
OR MORE PERSONS. 
Legislative History: 
Senate Bill 52, currently found in Utah Code Ann* section 
76-3-203*1, and referred to in L* 1990, ch. 207 section 1, was 
passed on February 21, 1990, approved on March 12, 1990, and became 
effective on April 23, 1990. 
The Office of Legislative Counsel to the Utah Legislature 
has no committee reports concerning this legislation. The only 
evidence of legislative intent to be found outside the statute 
itself is the taped and transcribed floor debates in the house and 
the senate. Tapes are available at the respective offices in the 
Utah State Capitol. 
House Floor debates on Senate Bill 52 
February 21, 1990 
Speaker of the House: 
Who's the sponsor of Senate Bill 52? Representative 
Rushton. 
Representative Rushton: 
Ah, this is kind of a surprise that it come up so fast this 
morning, ah, Senate Bill 52 is what's ended up after a lot 
of research this summer on the street gang problems, mostly 
in the Salt Lake County, some in Davis and Utah County. 
Ah, I'm sure most counties that have any town size at all 
will have ... be affected by the street gangs that are 
coming into Utah. There's several reasons why there's such 
a giant influx of criminal street gangs in Utah. The main 
reason is the price differential of crack cocaine. Ah, in 
Los Angeles, crack cocaine is in a surplus or a buyer's 
market. It can be bought between three and four hundred 
dollars an ounce. That same crack cocaine will sell in 
Salt Lake for somewhere around twenty four hundred dollars 
an ounce in some rural cities in Utah we'll get as much as 
three hundred ...er three thousand dollars an ounce. This 
price differential has brought about a phenomenon with the 
Los Angeles street gangs that's called franchising. The 
reason it's called franchising, it isn't a whole lot 
different than McDonald's. They franchise out. We've 
always had local street gangs in Utah. They've been 
involved in petty crime, a social service nuisance, anyone 
who lives in this metropolitan area is familiar with them, 
the graffiti, ah, when I was a boy thirty five years ago, 
there were street gangs in Salt Lake City. Ah, but they 
they weren't the serious problem that they are becoming now 
with the introduction of crack cocaine. Ah, police 
departments estimate that in the Salt Lake valley now there 
are six hundred plus members, identifiable members of these 
California style street gangs. Of that six hundred, it is 
estimated that a hardened criminal core of the gangs, 
generally young adults — the gangs consist of youths all 
the way from nine, and I call them youths, nine to twenty 
five, thirty years old. The young adults that belong to 
this gang are, these gangs, it is estimated about three 
percent of this group are hardened criminals with 
associations with the street gangs in Los Angeles. When I 
became aware of the existence of Los Angeles type gangs in 
existence in my own neighborhood in Magna, and West Valley, 
I become quite alarmed. It's a scary thought when we know 
what happened to the Bronx in New York in the sixties 
because of street gangs. Three hundred and seventy 
something acres of the Bronx had to be literally given up 
from the law enforcement and levelled. One of the most 
vivid pictures of the street gang history in New York City, 
er, the Bronx in New York was three hundred and seventy 
acres of what was once communities, towns, neighborhoods, 
as they call them in New York, and those buildings were 
bulldozed down, every last one of them, because of the 
situation that arose out of the Bronx street gangs in the 
fifties and sixties. Right now there are large areas of 
Los Angeles where law enforcement has given up. They have 
been bulldozed down. I don't think that situation will 
ever come to Salt Lake or to Ogden, Clearfield, where the 
street gangs are trenched right now, but elements of that 
environment have came to Salt Lake. Ah, Senator Fordham 
and myself become alarmed about this in about July of last 
year. We inquired of the Los Angeles County Attorney's 
Office on what was being done to prevent street gangs in 
there, they told us about a piece of legislation in 
California called "The Street Terrorism Prevention Act." 
We brought a copy of that act to Otah, we got a lot of 
literature about it, and we had a bill written up that 
patterned the Street Terrorism Act. But since that time, 
that act has run into constitutional problems in 
California, so we bad representatives from SWAP, do a lot 
of research on it, and they came up, the Statewide 
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, in conjunction with 
the Chief Police Association, came up with this bill, the 
SroQp criminal activities penalty, which they feel 
confident avoids the constitutional problems of the 
California Street Terrorism Act and will be a useful tool. 
It doesn't have the political or the psychological effects 
that our original Street Terrorism had, because we used the 
term gang, we used the term street terrorism in our bill, 
and they told us this was the reason why it would become 
constitutionally unsound. So, if you read the bill it will 
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not have the word "street gang" in it, in order to make it 
so we're not, the constitutional problem comes with 
labelling people by name* It is, looks benign, "Group 
Criminal Activities Penalty," but this is in fact what the 
Statewide of Prosecuting Attorneys have asked for and want 
for tools to be used against street gang prolification 
[sic] in the state of Utah. Ah, I can go through the act, 
ah, but the main parts of the act at first is it provides 
an enhanced penalty for group criminal activities, and that 
is supplied on line twenty four of first page, "if crimes 
are committed in concert of two or more persons" used in 
this second, the second page describes the enhanced 
penalties, ah, the idea behind the enhanced penalties in 
California and the idea here was to get that center core, 
that's the core group of hardened criminals that supplies 
the money, supplies the impetus for a true criminal street 
gang. We've got to differentiate that between a street 
gang and a criminal street gang - it's a different world 
altogether. Ah, it gets to the hardened core, and the 
social workers tell us that the only thing to do with them 
to allow social workers to work with the remainder of the 
young people at risk in these gangs is to get that hardened 
core off the streets. The enhanced penalty is designed for 
that purpose. Ah, so the second page deals with the 
enhanced penalties* The third page is a list of crimes 
that are effected by this bill and an important aspect of 
this bill that I hope will placate those that are worried 
about enhanced penalties, across this, I see John look at 
me right in the eyes. Because John and I have agreed on a 
lot of things and both of agree that enhanced penalties are 
something that has to be proven that there's a need for 
before you talk about it because a lot of enhanced 
penalties don't do anything more than create problems for 
the corrections. But this enhanced penalty, we have got to 
get that hard core of the street gang groups off of the 
streets, out of the street gangs. Ah, to soften the 
enhanced penalty, if you'll notice on the last page, page 
five of the bill, ah, the sentencing judge, rather than the 
jury, shall decide whether to impose the penalty. We are 
not going to make any effort to take the judicial 
discretion out of this penalty phase. It will give the 
judge the right, if he feels that that individual needs to 
be taken out of that situation for this enhanced period of 
time, the judge still has the discretion to either take him 
out for an enhanced period of time or - him, I shouldn't 
use. him - take this person out for enhanced period of time 
or not. Ah, I think that the bill is self explanatory and 
t-hac it does have the support of the Statewide Police Chief 
Xssociation and the Statewide Prosecuting Attorneys 
Association, ah, the bill came from them as an answer to a 
problem that we brought to them. And I'd stand to ask, 
answer, any questions, ah, ... 
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Speaker of the House: 
Representatives to the bill. Representative Millner? 
Representative Millner: 
Thank you, Mr, Speaker. First of all, I'd like to declare 
a conflict because I am a member of a street gang. I 
thought I'd get your attention with that. Um, I happen to 
have a group of young children in my neighborhood who are 
the siblings of members of street gangs. And, ah, in 
trying to perhaps dissuade them from criminal activities, 
we've formulated our own street gang, and of course our 
intents and purposes are perhaps to be, um, good for the 
neighborhood, and um, ah, we tried to take on little 
projects for that. But, I stand in support of this bill, 
but I do want to kind of state some concerns that I have, 
and that it that many times we have failed in our society 
to address in the concerns of our youth, which lead to 
juvenile street gangs, and I feel that many young people 
who come from broken homes and who don't have the 
environmental supports, or perhaps church support systems, 
kind of fall between the cracks. And so we have a 
responsibility, each one of us, if we see these young 
people, who get caught up in criminal activities, to try 
and become their friends and encourage them to get out of 
that kind of activity and lead them light, and so I stand 
in support of this bill, but I also want to send a 
message. And that message is that we need to provide 
opportunities for these young people, educational 
opportunities and employment for those who particularly get 
involved in juvenile crimes, and ah, so they don't get into 
drugs and other activities. And so I support the bill, 
thank you. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative Hales? 
Representative Hales: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I would like to speak in support 
of this very important legislation. I have a good citizen 
in my district who is in the business of coin operated game 
machines. Ah, he operates in several states, Utah is one 
of these, and he said in the past three or four months, 
these gang groups have cost him, as well as the stores, ah, 
Shopko, Smith's Pood King, as much as thirty thousand 
dollars in just a very short period of time. But he said 
in.addition to the theft, and the property damage that has 
occurred, he has been really concerned about the 
aggressiveness of these groups. He said that very often 
-these thefts occur during the time that the stores are 
open, sometimes at night when there's one night clerk on, 
they intimidate the night clerk. And as I became aware of 
this problem, and have visited with more people, I don't 
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think we're really talking about these neighborhood 
children that Representative Millner has talked about, 
although it could be. Ah, they say that these groups are 
sophisticated enough that they know what the state laws 
are, and very often they will move around according to what 
the state law is that handles this kind of theft and this 
kind of aggression and property damage. So I urge your 
support of this legislation. I think it's really important 
and I have my hat off to those who've, a Senator Fordham 
and those who have brought this to our attention. Thank 
you. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative, ah, Turtle? 
Representative Tuttle: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I stand in support of this bill 
also. In the Magna times issue this summer, there was an 
article and pictures about the grafitti that was put in the 
buildings in Magna by different groups that are either 
copycatting the groups in California or members, and I 
think it's well needed and I think we should support this. 
Thank you. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative Bush? 
Representative Bush: 
Oops. Thank you Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this . 
bill and I would ... Representative...sorry, Representative 
Rushton and Senator Fordham for looking into this. There's 
no sense waiting until our state becomes like some of these 
other areas of the country before we start doing something 
about it. I don't have any special horror stories to tell, 
but ah, this, I think this is one of the most important 
pieces of legislation we've had, and I commend them for it 
and ask you to support it. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative Prante? 
Representative Prante: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker, will the sponsor yield to a 
question? 
Representative Rushton: 
Yeah. 
Speaker of the House: 
Sponsor yields, proceed. 
S 
Representative Prante: 
Hefs sitting right next to me, but I just want this 
clarified for myself. It's bard to ask him when he's on 
the microphone. Ah, the question I have is I'm all for 
what the bill's doing, but the question I have and perhaps, 
ah, Representative Rusbton can respond to it, is that when 
it refers to that a person commits a — two or more people 
committing a crime, and ah, such crimes as burglary and 
criminal trespass being those kind of crimes, I'm wondering 
if anytime two people, especially young people who haven't 
learned, maybe are yielding to impulse sometimes, and 
aren't members of actual gangs, how does it impact on them? 
Representative Rushton: 
The answer to these question probably would be better 
answered by a lawyer than by me, but I'm told that it is 
contained in the following paragraph when it talks about 
the concert action of two or more persons. Ah, it's also 
will fall, the problem that he talks about if if just two 
people commit burglary together does this constitute group 
criminal activities? Or three people it would have to be. 
You got the two people and the individual, the individual 
who does this in concern with two other people. Ah, I 
think that the best cover here is in the judicial 
discretion that's allowed in the last page. Ah, and the 
definition of concert action between these people • a legal 
definition. 
Representative Prante: 
Where's the definition? 
Representative Rushton: 
Ah, it's in section 76-2-202. Yeah, well, that's the 
judicial. 
Representative Prante: 
Maybe you could just read the section that's applicable to 
this, Representative, that shows the court's discretion? 
Representative Rushton: 
I don't have my book with me. 
Representative Prante: 
Oh. Okay% Maybe ah, an attorney can comment on this. My 
concern isn't with what it's doing, it's with, what if two 
people _steal apples off a tree? Or what if two people 
"impossibly, impulsively take something from a home, are 
they suddenly convicted of essentially gang activities? •.• 
Ah, I see there is the court discretion in it. Okay, thank 
you. 
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Representative Rushton: 
Yeah, that's what I was saying, that, thank you. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative Fuller? 
Representative Fuller: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Call for a previous question? 
Speaker of the House: 
Previous question has been called. All in favor of the 
previous question say "Aye"? Opposed "no"? Motion 
carries. Representative Rushton, you may sum up. 
Representative Rushton: 
I could talk all night on gang problems in my neighborhood 
and all I have to say is when you see a young person with 
the blue skull cap of the California Crips 'gang in your 
neighborhood, if you're not scared, you don't understand 
what's going on. And ah, this law is directed at the core, 
it's not directed, as Joann has expressed, kids that are at 
risk, you see them wearing the gang signs, their ball cap 
turned around backwards on the West, or they sign each 
other with finger signs like this as they go by. Each gang 
has its own finger sign. Ah, these people that are at 
risk, and these are kids at risk. This bill is directed at 
that core criminal element, that three percent of those six 
hundred gang members that have been identified that provide 
the father figure in these gangs. And they provide also 
the connection the California gangs, the connection to the 
crack cocaine, the money that is fueling this explosion of 
gang activity in our cities and I'd like to ask you for 
your support for this bill and thank you for your time. 
Speaker of the House: 
Voting's open on Senate Bill 52. ... It appears to the 
chair that all present have voted. Voting is closed on 
Senate Bill 52. Senate Bill 52 has received 61 affirmative 
and no negative votes passes this House. 
7 
Senate Floor debates on Senate Bill 52 
January 23 and 24/ 1990 
January 23 , 1990 
Senator Fordham: 
Ah/ Mr. President and fellow Senators, this is an important 
bill. Ah/ we've worked on this bill since the middle of 
the summer/ worked with the Attorney General's Office, with 
prosecuting attorneys in this state, with other divisions 
of enforcement in this state. Originally, we had a bill 
called the "Organization Gang Bill." In ah working with 
California, who this bill was patterned after, their bill, 
and after they passed their law, we had an influx of gang 
members coming from California and infiltrating into Otah 
and establishing residence here and working as ah in their 
organization as members of, who had broken off from the 
California gangs. I think we need to send a message to 
these organized people that there isn't a place for them in 
Utah. Now we've had, in working with California, their 
problem was that it was so difficult to prove that a 
individual was a member of an organized gang. We changed 
our bill to read "Group Criminal Activity" and it involves 
when two or more commit a crime, then they're subject to 
the penalties that are made in this law. And ah let me 
just read what, quickly if I can, a class B misdemeanor, 
the individual shall serve a minimum of ninety consecutive 
days in the jail. If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, 
the convicted person shall serve a minimum term of a 
hundred and eighty consecutive days. If the offense is a 
third degree felony the convicted person shall be sentenced 
to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. If 
the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person 
shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years 
in prison. And if the. offense is a first degree felony, 
the person shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term 
of nine years in prison. We felt that we need to make very 
restrictrive [sic], and these, ah these charges would be 
administered and sentenced by the judge without always 
going to a jury hearing. It would depend on the ah crime 
that was committed if they had a jury hearing. I have many 
clippings, too many to go over# let me just read you the 
heads of some of these that happens in our state. "Warning 
signs blew up at side of girl's bed," and this is in 
school/ ah Eearns. Here's, "Suspect arrested in shooting 
at a market." This is in December 28 of last year. 
"Police believe two arrested teens belong to dangerous new 
qanqr" "Galig fight leaves three stabbed." "Street gang 
fires on a family/ two die." "Spray painted grafitti/" and 
this bill covers those acts, that if it's this kind of 
destruction of property is committed by two or more people, 
there's a penalty for them and they're, it's just something 
that we need to adopt to control this. Now in working with 
the prosecutors/ they felt that it was very difficult under 
the gang bill to identify these people with the gangs. 
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California, in working with them and talking with them, ah, 
wishes that they had developed their law the way we're 
developing this one in Utah. It would be much more 
enforceable by them. How I might just show you the volume 
here is the California gang law that they have. So if 
there are any questions that I could respond to, I'd be 
glad to, Mr. President. 
President of the Senate: 
Senator Chuck Peterson? 
Senator Chuck Peterson: 
Mr. Fordham, ah, Senator Fordham, is this differentiate, is 
it the location code a differentiation between juvenile and 
other people, I mean, ah, would your bill apply to 
juveniles under eighteen? 
Senator Fordham: 
It would apply to any crime that was committed by two or 
more persons. 
Senator Chuck Peterson: 
That's what I'm wondering about. I'll have to ask the 
legal people on the Senate, the lawyers, whether or not 
this is possible for us to pass legislation that would 
apply to, that would provide these penalties for a 
juvenile. I just don't know whether or not we can do 
that. Senator Hillyard? 
Senator Hillyard: 
My problem when I read that Senator Peterson is the fact 
that there's three of us here together and that may 
constitute a criminal gang. 
Senator Chuck Peterson: 
That's for sure. I think it does. Yeah, I, there's no 
question about that. 
Senator Hillyard: 
I would say this. The general law defining juveniles in 
that section would override this unless there is a specific 
mention of that and I'd have to look at the law. I was not 
on the committee when this bill was debated, ah, I had 
another conflict that took me out of these bills. I have 
not had a chance to see that but I think that's a 
legitimate question that staff who drafted the bill could 
answer. 
President of tlie-Senate: 
Senator Steel? 
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Senator Steele: 
Thank you, Mr. President, I have a question as it relate to 
ah, relates to a potential in our state of moving towards 
what's termed in many states, "shock incarceration"• In 
quick summary, as a listing, first time felons, for 
example, ages eighteen through twenty six are placed in 
some states in a ninety day incarceration boot camp 
environment• The recidivism, the impact on those 
particular individuals in the cites that I noted, I've had 
discussion with, seems to be very effective and very 
appealing and our state is looking as possible alternatives 
to what we're currently doing. Would these minimum, my 
question, these minimum requirements, ah circumvent that 
process? 
Senator Pordham: 
I don't think that it would circumvent it, I think they 
would be part of* The judge has the authority to say where 
these individuals would be incarcerated or be subjected to 
review or whatever, as I understand it, the judge would be 
able to put these people where they, where he felt that it 
would be the most good for them. 
President of the Senate: 
Further questions of Senator Pordham? Senator Cornaby, are 
you voting on that one... I don't see any further questions 
then. 
Unidentified speaker: 
I move for' the adoption of the bill. 
President of the Senate: 
Question has been called, for the question shall Senate 
Bill 52 be read for the third time? 
[Senators vote orally] 
Senate Bill 52 shows twenty five ayes, no nays, four being absent, 
the bill passes, to be placed on the third reading calendar. 
January 24, 1990 
President of the Senate: 
Senator McCallister? 
Senator Pordham 
Personal privilege Mr. 
